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Abstract 
[Excerpt] A decade ago, Eisenhardt (1989) proposed a model of strategic decision-making speed for firms 
facing high-velocity environments. This theory, while important at the time, has become even more 
relevant to the strategy-making bodies of firms in the entrepreneurial millennium. The model differed in 
important ways from much of the existing literature on decision-making speed (Frederickson and 
Mitchell, 1984; Janis, 1982; Mintzberg, et al., 1976; Nutt, 1976). Eisenhardt's ideas were based on a series 
of inductive case studies of eight firms competing in the fast-paced micro-chip industry. As such, it was 
an important theory-building effort in a central area of strategy process, strategic decision-making. To 
date, however, there have been no attempts to comprehensively test the model with a larger sample of 
firms. 
The changes the economy is experiencing in this new millennium are astounding. In short, the hyper-
competitive forces faced a decade ago by micro-chip makers have become pervasive throughout many of 
our top industries (D'Aveni, 1994; Grimm and Smith, 1997). Thus, the prescriptions of Eisenhardt's model 
would appear to be critical for today's firms as they seek entrepreneurial approaches to gaining 
competitive advantage. Top management teams (TMTs) capable of making rapid decisions can enable 
their firms to be the entrepreneurial first movers in their respective segments. To our knowledge, however, 
there has been only one attempt to replicate Eisenhardt's preliminary findings. Judge and Miller (1991) 
tested a portion of the model on a small sample (n = 32) of firms in three industries. The research tested 
two of the five "tactics" mentioned by Eisenhardt, did not incorporate the intervening processes, and 
produced mixed results. Thus, there have been no successful attempts to test the entire model on a large 
cross-section of firms. This is due in part to the difficulty researchers face in gaining access to a large 
sample of top executives, especially those facing fast-paced environments. This research tests 
Eisenhardt's model on a sample of 66 high technology firms competing in the IT, telecommunications, and 
engineering services industries. 
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Strategic Decision-Making in High Velocity 
Environments: A Theory Revisited and a Test 
Kevin Clark and Chris Collins 
Introduction 
A decade ago, Eisenhardt (1989) proposed a model of strategic decision-making speed for firms facing 
high-velocity environments. This theory, while important at the time, has become even more relevant to the 
strategy-making bodies of firms in the entrepreneurial millennium. The model differed in important ways 
from much of the existing literature on decision-making speed (Frederickson and Mitchell, 1984; Janis, 1982; 
Mintzberg, et al., 1976; Nutt, 1976). Eisenhardt's ideas were based on a series of inductive case studies of 
eight firms competing in the fast-paced micro-chip industry. As such, it was an important theory-building 
effort in a central area of strategy process, strategic decision-making. To date, however, there have been no 
attempts to comprehensively test the model with a larger sample of firms. 
The changes the economy is experiencing in this new millennium are astounding. In short, the 
hyper-competitive forces faced a decade ago by micro-chip makers have become pervasive throughout many 
of our top industries (D'Aveni, 1994; Grimm and Smith, 1997). Thus, the prescriptions of Eisenhardt's model 
would appear to be critical for today's firms as they seek entrepreneurial approaches to gaining competitive 
advantage. Top management teams (TMTs) capable of making rapid decisions can enable their firms to be 
the entrepreneurial first movers in their respective segments. To our knowledge, however, there has been 
only one attempt to replicate Eisenhardt's preliminary findings. Judge and Miller (1991) tested a portion of 
the model on a small sample (n = 32) of firms in three industries. The research tested two of the five "tactics" 
mentioned by Eisenhardt, did not incorporate the intervening processes, and produced mixed results. Thus, 
there have been no successful attempts to test the entire model on a large cross-section of firms. This is due 
in part to the difficulty researchers face in gaining access to a large sample of top executives, especially those 
facing fast-paced environments. This research tests Eisenhardt's model on a sample of 66 high technology 
firms competing in the IT, telecommunications, and engineering services industries. 
Research on Strategic Decision-Making 
Interest in top management teams has developed out of a belief on the part of researchers that the composition and 
functioning of this "dominant coalition" do a better job of describing organizational outcomes than does the study of 
the CEO alone (Cyert and March, 1963; Mintzberg, 1973; Kotter, 1982). Much of this literature has focused 
attention on the role the TMT plays in formulating organizational strategy through the decision process (Child, 
1972). The strategic decisions top executives make have important impacts on organizational outcomes such as 
financial returns, sales growth, and survival (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). 
Much of the early work on TMT strategic decision-making focused on the ability of the group to reach agreement 
on important issues (e.g., consensus), and the level of comprehensiveness demonstrated in their decision process 
(Bourgeois, 1980, 1985; Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984; Fredrickson and Iaquinto, 1989). A summary of this 
literature is found in Appendix A. The general results of these streams of literature were that consensus speeds issue 
resolution, but perhaps at a cost to quality (e.g., comprehensiveness), and that comprehensiveness is not feasible in 
all environments. These results were generally in line with the long-standing debate in the decisionmaking literature 
concerning the rationality of decision processes. Beginning with March and Simon (1958), decision theorists began 
to realize that actual decision processes deviated considerably from the rational ideal. Decision-makers were seen as 
cognitively limited, having conflicting goals, and proceeding through the decision process in a much less orderly 
fashion than rational models would suggest. As a result of "bounded rationality" and time and resource pressures, 
decision-makers often settled or "satisficed' on the first solution that addressed the problem rather than continuing to 
search for the optimal solution. Adding to the messiness of real decision processes was the acknowledgment that 
multiple and conflicting goals (and sometimes no goals at all) motivated decision-makers. Thus, three major schools 
of thought on decision-making emerged: (1) the rational school; (2) the incremental or boundedly rational school; 
and (3) the political school. Table 11.1 summarizes the major differences of these three schools of decision theory. 
Eisenhardt (1989) found that actual decision processes in high technology TMTs facing turbulent environments 
deviated from the rational ideal, but not to the extent incrementalists would suggest. In addition, Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois (1988) found that political processes were present in these TMTs, particularly in the slow TMTs. This 
was because fast TMTs realized the inefficiency of politics and employed tactics to minimize the use of politics in 
their teams. Further, she found that certain TMTs were able to inject a considerable level of rationality into their 
decision processes with no penalty in decision speed. Thus, Eisenhardt observed actual decision processes in TMTs 
of high technology organizations to be a combination of the three theoretical perspectives on decision-making. 
Rather than a purely incremental approach, as empirical research would suggest, fast TMTs incorporated aspects of 
rationality into their process while attempting to minimize the propensity for political behavior at these levels of the 
organization. Finally, based on a small sample of inductive case studies, she developed a model of fast 
decision-making consisting of five decision "tactics" and three mediating processes that fast TMTs used to increase 
both the comprehensiveness and the pace of their strategic decision process. 
Three studies have built on Eisenhardt's ideas during the ten years since the model was introduced. Judge and 
Miller (1991) confirmed a portion of the model and demonstrated a link between fast strategic decision-making and 
firm performance in turbulent industries. Wally and Baum (1994) developed a model of decision pace based loosely 
on the ideas of Eisenhardt and tested on a sample of 151 firms in various industries. Finally, Hambrick et al. (1996) 
developed and tested a model of competitive speed (e.g., speed of implementation of firm actions and responses) 
based in part on demographic proxies for TMT decision process. In general, these models provide a fair level of 
support for the Eisenhardt model for firms facing turbulent environments. The contributions and contextual insights 
of these studies are mentioned below as they relate to the components of the Eisenhardt model. 
Table 11.1 Three schools of decision theory 
Characteristic Rational Incremental Political 
Search process 
Selection of solution 
Managers are: 
Decision process 
unfolds: 
Information is: 
Decision pace is: 
Process suitable for: 
Maximizing 
Maximizing 
Efficient processors 
Sequentially 
Available 
Slow 
Stable environment 
Limited Satisficing 
Cognitively limited 
Sequentially 
Costly 
Fast 
Turbulent environment 
Haphazard 
Based on Power and Influence 
Non-rational, self-interested 
Randomly, iteratively 
Controlled by the powerful 
Varies, but typically slow 
Ambiguous environment 
Decision-making tactics 
Eisenhardt (1989) found that fast TMTs used five "tactics" to speed up the decisionmaking process. Moreover, the 
slower TMTs either failed to use these, or differed substantially in the implementation of the tactics. Importantly, 
some of these tactics are not only associated with increases in the speed with which strategic decisions are made, 
but also impact the level of rationality of the process. 
Real-time information use. Fast TMTs made extensive use of scanning and reporting to continuously update their 
understanding of the position of the company, its competitors, and environment. Eisenhardt hypothesized that this 
activity allowed the members of the group to be on the same page, and to minimize the time needed to gear up for 
important decision issues facing the firm. Thus, the use of real-time information tactics by the TMT increased the 
pace of cognitive processing in the teams and led to smooth group process (e.g., consensus and conflict resolution) 
since all team members had access to similar information. Interestingly, in addition to increasing the pace of 
decision-making, the use of this tactic resulted in a more rational decision process. 
Multiple simultaneous alternatives. Eisenhardt also found that fast TMTs tended to look at multiple alternatives 
side-by-side, rather than in a serial fashion. Typically, this process was proceeded by a brainstorming session where 
TMT members attempted to generate a comprehensive list of possible courses of action. The use of simultaneous 
comparison aided the teams in their ability to discern subtle differences between alternatives and to quickly discard 
those that were inferior. This led to a speedy identification of a small number of worthy courses of action from 
which to choose. Thus, the side-by-side decision tactic allowed the TMT to accelerate its processing of the impor-
tant issues. Further, Eisenhardt proposed that the process of generating a large number of alternatives and narrowing 
them down using a clear method increased the confidence of the TMT to act on the decision. As Eisenhardt notes, 
the use of multiple simultaneous alternatives resulted in a more comprehensive or exhaustive development of 
alternatives, and thus incorporated elements of the rational ideal. 
Wally and Baum (1994) proposed that increases in the cognitive ability of TMT members would enable them to 
assess multiple alternatives simultaneously. Using a cognitive test and a education-level proxy, they determined that 
cognitive complexity of TMT members was positively related to decision pace. Though cognitive ability could 
reasonably affect decision process in multiple ways, this result lends some insight into the Eisenhardt model. 
Decision integration. Eisenhardt found that fast TMTs attempted to integrate decisions to fit into an overall pattern 
or plan. Again, the "fit" requirement served as an additional decision rule with which the TMT could differentiate 
between seemingly sound alternative courses of action. Thus, TMTs that integrated decisions with past decisions 
were able to quickly resolve ambiguities of choice and felt confident that the current decision matched previous 
efforts. Thus these TMTs experienced accelerated cognitive processing and an increased decision efficacy. 
Two-tier advice process. Eisenhardt also found that fast TMTs used two practices in order to break deadlock within 
the team. One such practice was the use by the CEO of an experienced "counselor" that resulted in a two-tier advice 
process. The "counselor," as described by Eisenhardt, was an experienced executive who had reached a career 
plateau, and thus could be trusted to give sound advice based on extensive experience. Wally and Baum (1994) 
found that experienced executives sometimes used heuristics to speed the decision-making process. The use by the 
CEO of an experienced counselor may also be relying to some extent on the unmeasured use of heuristics as well. 
Furthermore, Wally and Baum (1994) found that centralization was related to decision pace. This is because 
centralized decision processes use less consultation and decision-makers in a centralized structure may have greater 
feelings of control and thus be more confident to act. In the context of the TMT, the reliance by the CEO on a 
trusted advisor is a form of centralization. 
Eisenhardt did not differentiate insider vs. outsider status, but clearly either situation could fit the counselor 
profile. The counselor aided the decision process by providing the CEO with a sounding board on tough issues that 
the TMT was having difficulty in resolving. The existence of a counselor benefited the decision process by breaking 
the deadlock (e.g., thus accelerating the decision process); increasing smooth group process by virtue of resolving 
the conflict, and in providing additional confidence on the part of the CEO to act on the decision. 
Consensus with qualification. Fast TMTs were also using a tie-breaker rule termed "consensus with qualification." 
Under this tactic, TMTs specified a set amount of time to attempt to reach consensus on strategy, after which the 
CEO was authorized by the group to make the call. Because the group pre-authorized the use of fiat by the CEO 
after having an opportunity to be heard, such TMTs experienced smooth group process. Obviously, the stalemate 
breaker tactic increased the decision speed of teams facing such a crisis. Consensus with qualification is an explicit 
compromise between the rationality of extensive attempts to reach consensus, and the very real need highlighted in 
incrementalism to cut the debate at some point. Hambrick et al. (1996) postulated that diverse TMTs would be able 
to conceive of and launch new actions rapidly because of expansive repertoires for action. At the same time, they 
acknowledged the large body of research that demonstrates the association between diversity and dissensus. Thus, 
Hambrick et al. proposed and found that TMT heterogeneity increased the propensity for action but at a cost to 
speed. Eisenhardt's model suggests the consensus with qualification tactic as a method with which to avoid the 
penalty of diversity to decision speed. 
Intervening processes 
Although Eisenhardt did not measure process, she did explain the linkages between decision "tactics' and decision 
speed as working through process. These linkages have been described above, however, the link between process 
and decision speed requires further discussion. 
Accelerated cognitive processing. Accelerated cognitive processing refers to the ability of the TMT to rapidly 
consider larger amounts of, often ambiguous, information. TMTs that have greater cognitive capacity of this sort are 
better equipped to resolve decision issues quickly, especially those being made under conditions of uncertainty and 
time pressure. Thus accelerated cognitive processing was proposed to be a primary factor in decision speed. 
Smooth group process. In addition to the ability to deal with large amounts of information, Eisenhardt proposed that 
TMTs experiencing smooth group process would make quicker decisions. Although the conceptualization of what 
exactly constitutes "smooth process" is not clear from the Eisenhardt piece, in a general sense she is referring to the 
ability of the TMT to resolve conflict and reach agreement on difficult decision issues. 
Confidence to act. Finally, Eisenhardt developed the argument that an important element of decision speed would 
be the confidence of the TMT to act on their decisions. In the case studies, she found that slower groups often 
vacillated back and forth in their quest to be absolutely certain, the result being a very drawn-out decision process. 
By contrast, fast TMTs developed the necessary confidence to make the decision once the solution became clear. 
Such efficacious decision processes dramatically improved the pace of decision-making in these teams. Wally and 
Baum (1994) also found that the confidence to act was a determinant of decision speed. In their study, confidence 
to act was viewed as stemming from personality characteristics of the TMT members. For example, TMT members 
with an internal locus of control and those with a high tolerance for risk were found to be more confident. Thus, in 
addition to decision tactics employed by TMT members, individual attributes may play a significant role in decision 
process. Figure 11.1 shows the model of fast strategic decision-making as proposed by Eisenhardt. 
Method 
The target population for the study was high-technology public and private organizations located in the mid-Atlantic 
region of the USA. Within each company, data was collected from multiple respondents: (1) detailed questionnaires 
were completed by members of the top management team; and (2) a structured interview was conducted with the 
CEO of each firm. 
Sample and research procedures 
Companies were selected for participation based on three key conditions. First, to ensure that the firms in the sample 
were similar across a number of basic characteristics, the companies had to conform to the definition of 
high-technology firms. This research was focused on high technology firms because many of these firms face 
"high-velocity" environments, which require constant change and innovation (Eisenhardt, 1989). Milkovich (1987: 
80) defined the relevant features of high-technology industries as "firms that emphasize invention and innovation in 
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Figure 11.1 Eisenhardt's model of fast decision-making 
their business strategy, deploy a significant percentage of their financial resources to R and D, employ a relatively 
high percentage of scientists and engineers in their workforce, and compete in worldwide, short-life-cycle product 
markets." Second, because of the time commitments involved in conducting the interviews for the study, 
organizations needed to be located within a three-hour driving distance from the research location. Third, the sample 
was restricted to firms meeting a size threshold of 50 or more employees (most were much larger, see below). This 
eliminated the inclusion of high technology startup firms that face constraints on decision-making stemming from 
venture-capital involvement.1 
A list of high technology companies meeting these criteria was developed by using two sources. Initially, firms 
were identified through the 1998 Mid-AtlanTech Almanac. This almanac, published by TechCapital (a regional 
high-tech publication) contains company profiles, including information about the core business of the firm, contact 
addresses and phone numbers, number of employees, and names of top managers. Additional organizations were 
identified through a regional high-technology council. Following these procedures we identified 110 public and 40 
high technology firms that were actively operating in the region. 
To gain access to organizations, the research team followed a three-step protocol. First, the research team sent a 
package of four letters to the CEO/President outlining and endorsing the study. The first letter was from the 
research team introducing the project and outlining the goals of the research. Support letters from the Dean of the 
Business School, the University's Center for Entrepreneurship, and TechCapital were used to lend credibility and 
legitimacy to the research project and reinforce the importance of the study. In the second step, the research team 
called each CEO to schedule interviews (after allowing for sufficient time for the letters to be received and read). 
In the final step, each CEO or President was interviewed for approximately one hour. There were three main 
purposes for the site visit with the CEO. First, the interview was a way to gain the support and endorsement of the 
CEO (including the signed letter of support and internal contact person). Second, the interview was used to collect 
information on the competitive environment (turbulence, munificence, complexity, etc.) of the firm. Finally, the 
CEO was asked to identify the members of their top management team. As part of this interview, each CEO was 
asked to sign a letter encouraging identified executives to complete questionnaires, and to identify an internal 
contact who could help the research team distribute and collect surveys. This step was necessary to obtain a full set 
of responses from employees inside each organization. 
Of the 110 public firms contacted, we obtained full responses from 48 for a participation rate of 44 percent. Of 
the 40 private firms contacted, we obtained full responses from 18 for a participation rate of 46 percent. The 
average number of top managers that responded per firm was 3.24. The companies agreeing to participate were not 
significantly different from those not participating in terms of reported sales (tuo = 1.364, p > .05), or number of 
employees (tuo= 1.695 , p > .05). There was a large variance in the size of firms in the sample, both in terms of 
number of employees (45 to 16,668) and in revenue ($1.2 million to $4 billion). The average size of organizations 
in the study was 1,742 full-time employees, with a standard deviation of 3,391 employees. 
Variable definition and measurement 
All of the items used in this research were five-point Likert type scales. Each variable consists of between two and 
four items. For each variable, items and scale reliabilities are contained in Appendix B. 
Real-time information. Eisenhardt suggests that fast decision-making groups are often more comprehensive in their 
search than their slower counterparts. However, fast decision-making groups only use real-time information about 
competitors or their environment. We measured TMT use of real-time information with items such as: every 
member of the TMT knows where our organization is in its progress toward our goals; and, This TMT continuously 
monitors how our organization is performing. 
Multiple simultaneous alternatives. Though the literature suggests that the consideration of many alternatives 
(comprehensiveness) can slow the decision-making process, Eisenhardt proposed that the number of alternatives 
considered was not important, rather, it was the manner in which they were considered. Fast TMTs were able to 
simultaneously consider many possible courses of action. We measured the comprehensiveness of the TMTs search 
with items like: Our TMT develops an exhaustive set of alternatives before making important management 
decisions; and, Our TMT seeks advice from all the firm's functional areas when making important strategic 
decisions. 
Two-tier advice process. Eisenhardt proposed that fast TMT decisions often occurred when the CEO used a 
two-tiered process. First, the CEO would consult the entire TMT, and then would rely on a smaller subset, perhaps 
an individual counselor, to make the final decision. We measured the tendency of the CEO to rely on a small group 
of "counselors" with the following items: When the group cannot reach consensus easily, the CEO will often consult 
a senior member of the TMT to reach a decision; and, the CEO often makes decisions with the aid of one or two 
members of the TMT. 
Consensus with qualification. A particularly effective strategy for reaching quick decisions was termed "consensus 
with qualification". Fast TMTs operated under the rule that if consensus was not forthcoming, the CEO would make 
the decision. We measured the use of such strategies with items like: When members of the TMT disagree on an 
important decision, the CEO often has to step in to make the final decision; and, when TMT members disagree on 
an important decision, the CEO ends up listening to different viewpoints but making up his/her own mind. 
Decision integration. Fast TMTs were those that evaluated each decision in the context of prior decisions. TMTs 
that were better able to integrate their decision-making, were also able to make decisions in a shorter amount of 
time. We measured the degree to which TMTs integrated their decisions into an overall framework with items such 
as: We consider the impact of one strategic decision on the other strategic decisions we have made; and, we try to 
place strategic decisions into an overall pattern or plan. 
Accelerated cognitive processing. To the extent that TMTs use strategies (e.g., consensus with qualification, 
decision integration), rely on experienced members, and keep up to date (e.g., real-time information) they are better 
able to quickly process the information with which they are faced. We measure this ability in TMTs with the 
following items: When the need arises to make key decisions, the members of this TMT are already "on the same 
page," and, when making strategic decisions, we often have to re-familiarize ourselves with the key issues involved 
(reversed). 
Smooth group process. Eisenhardt observed that fast TMTs often had developed smooth group processes. TMT 
members were familiar with one another, and avoided unnecessary conflict. We measured the "smoothness" of 
TMT process with items like: Members of the TMT get along with each other well. 
Confidence to act. Fast TMTs were confident of their ability to make the right decisions. This confidence was based 
in part on the strategies they used (multiple simultaneous alternatives, decision integration), and on their up-to date 
knowledge of the current situation (real-time information). We measured the confidence of TMTs to act with the 
following items: The quality of this TMT's decisions gives me the confidence to act, and I feel this TMT can solve 
any problem we encounter; and I have confidence in the TMT's ability to make sound decisions. 
Decision speed. Decision speed has been linked to performance, particularly for firms facing turbulent 
environments. We measured the decision speed of TMTs with the following items: This TMT moves quickly to 
make key strategic decisions; It takes this TMT too long to make important decisions (reversed); and, this TMT 
routinely makes important decisions in under one month. This approach differs slightly from that used by 
Eisenhardt. First, Eisenhardt assessed quick decisions as those made in under four months, and measured the length 
of the decision process as a continuous variable. Secondly, we incorporate a relative measure of decision speed to 
complement the absolute measure used in previous studies. We believe this approach better captures the meaning of 
"fast" decisions in the even more turbulent environment now faced by firms. 
Results 
The results of the study provide moderate support for the Eisenhardt model. As can be seen in table 11.2, the 
correlations amongst many of the key variables of Eisenhardt's model are very strong. High levels of 
multi-collinearity between independent variables can result in unstable betas, though this does not affect the overall 
R-squared for the model (Pedhazur, 1982). Green (1978: 227-8) suggests three strategies for dealing with high levels 
of intercorrelation in predictor measures: (1) ignore it; (2) delete one or more of the correlated variables; or (3) 
transform the predictors into a new set of mutually uncorrelated variables by use of a data reduction algorithm like 
factor analysis. Option 1 seems cavalier, however, Green suggests that under certain circumstances this may be the 
best course of action. First, when standard errors are high, multicollinearity is likely to be a problem. Second, 
regressions may be re-run after randomly dropping some observations (Green suggests 20 percent). If the results of 
the reduced sample are similar to the original results, then multicollinearity is not likely to be a problem. In the 
present analysis, the standard errors were not large. Furthermore, they remained stable when the sample was 
randomly reduced. The mediated regression was re-run after randomly dropping 10 observations (approximately 20 
percent). The results were virtually identical to the full-sample regressions. Thus, it appears that the moderate levels 
of intercorrelation in the independent variables do not cause problems of interpretation of the results. A factor 
analysis was also performed and the results are reported later. 
Mediated regression analysis was utilized to better understand the relationships amongst the independent 
variables, the intervening processes, and decision speed. Table 11.3 shows the results of the direct and mediated 
regression on decision speed. Tables 11.4, 11.5, and 11.6 show the regressions of the independent variables on the 
mediating processes. Figure 11.2 shows the direct relationships between decision "tactics" and decision speed. 
The results of our analysis show strong support for three of Eisenhardt's five propositions with respect to the link 
between decision tactics and decision speed. Indeed, the model explained 76.9 percent of the variance in decision 
speed for this sample of firms. In support of Eisenhardt's first proposition, real-time information use was found to 
affect decision speed (/J = .417, p < .001) through its impact on the TMT's accelerated cognitive processing (j3 = 
.390, p < .001) and through their confidence to act (P = .392, p < .001). In support of proposition two, the 
consideration of multiple simultaneous alternatives by the TMT affected decision speed (/? = .324, p < .001) 
through its impact on the TMT's accelerated cognitive processing (/? = .367, p < .001) and through their confidence 
to act (/? = .363, p < .001) (P2). Contrary to Eisenhardt's model, the use of real-time information was not found to 
be linked to smooth group process, however, it was linked to TMT confidence (/? = .392, p < .001, not predicted by 
Eisenhardt). Smooth group process was not found to be linked to decision speed. No other independent variables 
were found to be related to either accelerated cognitive processing or TMT confidence to act. Finally, some support 
for proposition five was demonstrated as decision integration was found to affect decision speed ((5 = .251, p < 
.05), not through the mediating processes as proposed, but directly (P5). Figures 11.2 and 11.3 show the direct and 
mediated models. Note that the direct links to decision speed for both real-time processing and multiple 
simultaneous alternatives drop when the mediating processes are introduced to the model. Only decision integration 
links directly to decision speed rather than through mediating processes as Eisenhardt proposed. In conclusion, the 
results of our analysis provide moderate support for the propositions of Eisenhardt's inductive case studies. 
Table 11.7 Factor Analysis of decision tactics 
Decision integration 
Real-time information use 
Multiple simultaneous alternatives 
Consensus w/qualification 
Two-Tier advice system 
Parallelism 
.819 
.869 
.839 
-.008 
-.386 
Tie-Breaker 
-.185 
-.009 
-.345 
.950 
.834 
A principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation was also performed to further validate the results 
reported above. This data reduction strategy transforms the correlated predictors into uncorrelated factors. Factor 
scores can then be entered in to the regression model in the place of intercorrelated predictor measures. The 
downside of this method is that some level of richness and detail is lost during the transformation. The factor 
analysis (table 11.7) extracted factors: the first factor was comprised of the real-time use of information, 
consideration of multiple simultaneous alternatives, and decision integration tactics. This factor was labeled 
"parallelism" since each of the components refers to a tactic that involves analysis in parallel. The second factor was 
comprised of the consensus with qualification and two-tier advice system tactics. The second factor was labeled 
"tie-breaker" since both components are tactics used to resolve dissensus. The results of the regression of decision 
speed on the two decision tactics factors was consistent with the results reported above. The parallelism factor was 
related to decision speed (ft = .823, p < .001), while the tie-breaker factor was not (P=-.069,p=M5. 
Table 11.2 Correlation table 
RT SA 2-tier CQ Dl AP SP CA DS 
Real-time information 1.000 
Simultaneous alternatives 747a 1.000 
Two-tier advice -.419 -.542a 1.000 
Consensus w/qualification -.189 -.415a 708a 1.000 
Decision integration .581a .639a - 4 8 3 a - . 2 2 8 1.000 
Accelerated processing .715a 7 6 2 a - 4 7 0 a - . 3 6 0 a ,572a 1.000 
Smooth process ,628a 7 0 3 a - . 6 1 2 a - , 4 2 3 a ,566a .815a 1.000 
Confidence to act 7 3 4 a 7 8 4 a - . 5 5 8 a - . 3 4 5 a ,580a .879a .829a 1.000 
Decision speed 7 5 3 a 7 3 0 a - , 3 5 4 a - . 145 .667a .816a 7 2 7 a .804a 1.000 
N = 66. a significant at p < .01 level (2-tailed) 
Table 11.3 Predicting decision speed 
Step Variable (3 
1 Real-time information .417C 3.908 
Simultaneous alternatives .324c 2.680 
2-tier advice .048 .401 
Consensus with qualification .081 .745 
Decision integration .251a 2.516 
2 Real-time information .158 1.714 
Simultaneous alternatives .095 .882 
2-tier advice .089 .859 
Consensus with qualification .147 1.598 
Decision integration .196a 2.359 
Smooth group process .105 .920 
Confidence to act ,225a 2.245 
Accelerated cognitive processes .3223 2.687 
Dependent variable = Decision speed, step 1 R2 = .658; step 2 R2 = .769 
N = 66 
*p< .05,hp< , 01 , c ^< .001 
Table 11.4 Predicting smooth group process 
Variable [3 t 
Realtime 
Simultaneous alternatives 
2-tier advice 
Consensus with qualification 
Decision integration 
238a 
.282a 
-.204 
-.079 
.139 
1.475 
2.006 
-1.168 
-.626 
1.197 
Dependent variable = Decision speed, R2 = .530 
N = 66, * p< .05,bp< . 0 1 / p < .001 
Table 11.5 
Variable 
Predicting confidence to act 
P t 
Realtime 
Simultaneous alternatives 
2-tier advice 
Consensus with qualification 
Decision integration 
.392c 
.363° 
-.167 
-.014 
.038 
3.719 
3.034 
-1.426 
-.134 
.387 
Dependent variable = Decision speed, R2 = .660 
N = 66 , 1 /K .05 , b />< .01 , c />< .001 
Decision tactics 
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Multiple 
simultaneous 
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Figure 11.2 Direct relationships 
Table 11.6 Accelerated cognitive processing 
Variable P 
Realtime information 
Simultaneous alternatives 
2-tier advice process 
Consensus with qualification 
Decision integration 
.390c 
.367" 
.055 
-.169 
.098 
3.487 
2.895 
-.438 
-1.482 
.937 
Dependent variable = Decision speed, R2 = 
N = 66, 'p< .QS,bp< .01,c/>< .001 
.618 
Discussion 
In general, the results of this research support Eisenhardt's central, if unstated, claim that fast TMTs are able to 
simultaneously inject a measure of rationality into their decision process without an adverse impact on decision 
speed. Certainly, we found that fast TMTs did this through the use of such tactics as the use of real-time informa-
tion, side-by-side consideration of alternatives, and by integrating current decision issues with existing plans. The 
story is much more complex, however, and a closer examination of the results yields insights into the true 
functioning of fast TMTs. Figure 11.3 (below) contains the revised model of fast strategic decision-making. 
Real-time information use. As Eisenhardt proposed, the use of real-time information increased strategic 
decision-making indirectly through decision process. As predicted, real-time information use accelerated cognitive 
processing in the TMT leading to increased decision speed. Eisenhardt hypothesized that accelerated cognitive 
processing in such teams would be the result of the development of real-time information tactics of intuition. An 
alternative explanation is that TMTs whose members keep current are able to begin processing earlier than those 
TMTs whose members have to spend time gearing up for decisions. 
This research found that the use of real-time information gave the TMT increased confidence to act ultimately 
increasing decision speed. It is interesting that Eisenhardt did not propose the linkage between real-time information 
and confidence to act, which would appear to be fairly straightforward. Simply put, TMTs that continually update 
their knowledge bases concerning the state of the firm, the activities of rivals, and changes in the competitive 
environment are likely to perceive that they have a good grasp of the current situation. Such teams are likely to feel 
that they have left no stone unturned. The perception in the team that they have prepared themselves and have been 
comprehensive (e.g., up-to-date) in their search will directly bolster their confidence to act on such information. 
Such teams may experience what Hambrick and colleagues (1996) termed a higher propensity to act. This 
explanation is supported by evidence provided by Eisenhardt concerning the inability of certain TMTs to make 
decisions. She describes one team that continually sought more and more information, due to a fear that they were 
overlooking some key factor. 
Finally, while real-time information use was associated, as Eisenhardt predicted, with smooth group process, this 
linkage did not impact decision speed in this sample. 
Consideration of multiple simultaneous alternatives. Again, the predictions of the Eisenhardt model are strongly 
supported. TMTs that were able to simultaneously assess several alternatives experienced increased confidence to 
act and accelerated cognitive processing. As Eisenhardt explained, the practice of comparing alternatives 
side-by-side helps TMTs to readily discern and evaluate slight differences and ambiguities. These differences may 
be very difficult for TMT members to recall and evaluate given a serial decision process. Indeed, TMTs may have to 
revisit earlier alternatives to resolve ambiguities adding time to the decision process. The insights garnered from a 
simultaneous comparison process helps solidify the preferences of TMT members resulting in increased conviction 
in the solution that is chosen. 
Although such groups experienced smoother group process, this was not related to decision speed. Even though 
not directly relevant to this study, smooth group process has been associated in the literature with various desirable 
outcomes. The argument is that the use of a side-by-side comparison process drastically reduces the chance for 
divergent perceptions of the "facts" by forcing TMT members to evaluate alternatives simultaneously. Serial, 
particularly if temporally dispersed, modes of evaluation contain much greater opportunity for such 
misunderstandings to occur and to fester, ultimately leading to decreased functionality of group process. 
Decision integration. Eisenhardt (1989) proposed that the attempt to match current decisions with an existing 
overall pattern of strategy would speed the decision process by accelerating the cognitive processing of the team, 
and by increasing their confidence to act. While this research found that decision integration is related to decision 
speed, the link is direct, rather than through mediating processes. 
There are several clues as to why the form of the relationship identified in this research deviates from the model 
as originally proposed. From Eisenhardt (1989), "[TMTs] maintained mental maps of how decisions fit together" 
and "[they] simultaneously kept in mind multiple decisions" (ibid.: 567) and "such integration may limit 
discontinuities between decisions" (ibid.: 566). These statements suggest that decision integration is an on-going 
process that transforms "batch" to "process" decisionmaking. Because fast TMTs view decisions as a continual 
integrated procession, they do not have to gear up for new issues - they remain in a state of heightened readiness. 
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Figure 11.3 Revised model of fast strategic decision-making 
Importantly, this concept is distinct from Eisenhardt's "accelerated processing" in that it is really continual rather 
than speedy processing. Perhaps an apt analogy is that of the tortoise (continual processing) vs. the hare (accelerated 
processing). Of course, the most speedy decisions will be made by a tortoise with a kick. Additional support for this 
explanation can be found in Eisenhardt's observation that slow TMTs often shifted from stalemated inactivity to 
making "snap" decisions. In summary, decision integration is likely a standalone process, rather than an antecedent 
to accelerated cognitive processing. 
Intervening processes. Two of the three intervening processes, confidence to act and accelerated cognitive 
processing, were found to be strong predictors of decision speed. These findings lend good support for the 
Eisenhardt model and are generally consistent with the results reported by Wally and Baum (1994).2 The present 
research cannot assess whether the confidence certain TMTs felt to act was based predominantly on the decision 
tactics employed by the team (e.g., use of real-time information and the simultaneous evaluation of alternatives), on 
certain personality factors as Wally and Baum propose, or on other factors such as past performance. Accelerated 
cognitive processing was also found to be a strong predictor of decision speed. Although Eisenhardt describes 
accelerated cognitive processing as emanating from "deep personal knowledge of the enterprise that allows (TMTs) 
to access and interpret information rapidly when major decisions arise" (1989: 570), it may be that the use of 
real-time information simply allows these teams to begin the processing component of decision-making earlier than 
other teams. Regardless of the actual mechanism, TMTs that experience accelerated cognitive processing do make 
quicker decision. 
Finally, the non-finding for the proposed linkage between TMT smooth process and decision speed is worthy of 
some discussion. Smooth process has been the topic of substantial research on TMT decision-making (Hickson et 
al., 1986; Mintzberg, 1973). Implicit in many of these studies is the idea that smooth process, particularly consen-
sus, will lead to faster decision-making. It is, therefore, intriguing that this relationship was not detected in this 
study. There are two plausible explanations for this: (1) differences in the operationalization of the smooth process 
construct; and (2) smooth process may work through another construct. 
In this study, smooth group process was operationalized as a linear combination of the standardized team scores 
for cohesion, consensus, and conflict. In Eisenhardt's study group process was referred to as the ability of the TMT 
to deal constructively with conflict and thus move the group to a decision. Though our definition of smooth process 
does not, on the surface, appear to deviate muOch from what Eisenhardt intended, the research findings regarding 
the effects of cohesion and conflict have been varied. For example, as Amason (1996) details, the upper echelons 
stream has consist-endy proposed that conflict is dysfunctional for decision-making groups, while others have 
indicated that certain types of conflict may actually help the decision process (Murray, 1989; Amason, 1996; 
Amason and Sapienza, 1997). Similarly, the impact of cohesion on group outcomes has been varied (Janis, 1972; 
Bourgeois, 1980, 1985). Therefore, a more careful operationalization of the construct may sort out the linkage 
between smooth process and decision speed. 
An alternative explanation may be that smooth group process works through increased confidence to act. The 
logic for this specification of the model comes from the "groupthink" literature (Janis, 1972). In essence, groups 
that experience extremely smooth process may develop interaction norms such that the ideas of team members 
quickly converge, with little or no dissent. What may occur in such teams is a self-reinforcing escalation of 
confidence. Team members may develop hubris with respect to the group decision based in part on the lack of 
disconfirming voices. While this scenario is clearly dysfunctional from the perspective of decision quality, it may 
help explain the strong linkage detected in this research between decision efficacy and decision speed. 
Conclusion 
In a nutshell, Eisenhardt was on to something. Firms facing turbulent environments can take greater control over 
their decision-making processes by instituting certain tactics and by developing certain processes. Further, these 
TMTs can actually increase the speed with which they make decisions while simultaneously improving decision 
rationality. While the essence of Eisenhardt's arguments is correct, the findings of this research highlight the 
critical role theory testing plays in conjunction with inductive theory development research. Ultimately, it is the 
interplay of these two approaches to research over multiple iterations that leads the field to new insights and greater 
understanding. Just as inductive research seeks to clarify the questions that should be studied, and proposes 
potential linkages to be tested, so too deductive research should propose new directions for further study. It is to 
this task that we now turn. 
Figure 11.2 contains a modified model of fast decision-making based on the results of this cross-sectional study. 
The model is not complete, however, since there are many factors that could reasonably be expected to impact 
decision speed, but which were omitted from the model as originally proposed by Eisenhardt. Many of these factors 
have been alluded to in the preceding discussion, however, it is important to reiterate them here for ease of 
reference. 
Controls. There are several compositional factors that might reasonably be expected to impact TMT decision speed. 
Chief among these is the cognitive capacity of the individual executives that comprise the TMT. Wally and Baum 
(1994) found that TMTs whose members had greater cognitive complexity were able to make quicker decisions. A 
second factor that may affect the speed of decision-making in the TMT is the propensity of executives to take risks. 
To the extent that TMT members are willing to "roll the dice' the decision process should progress more rapidly. 
Such teams are less likely to experience the "analysis paralysis" described by Eisenhardt. Wally and Baum (1994) 
also suggest the use of a team size control. This is consistent with earlier research that demonstrates the process 
difficulties oflarger teams. A final control that should be included in subsequent studies of decision pace is the rate 
of change found in the firm's primary industry (note: Eisenhardt controls for this by virtue of conducting a single 
industry study, while Judge and Miller (1991) determined that this was an important contextual variable for 
strategic decision-making). 
Leader behavior. Eisenhardt focuses considerable attention on the behaviors the CEO exhibits during times of 
stalemate (e.g., seeking counsel, instituting tie-breaker rules), but she does not incorporate the variety of other CEO 
behaviors that could reasonably be expected to impact the pace at which decisions occur in the TMT. For example, a 
transactional leader may develop in their TMT a very different process than an autocrat - one that most certainly 
would impact decision speed. The approaches detailed by Eisenhardt appear to be hybrids that incorporate some 
aspects of decentralization (some form of consultation with other members of the TMT), while still retaining a 
semblance of autocracy (ultimately, the CEO calls the shot). Neither of these tactics was found to be associated with 
increased decision speed. In the interest of informing future research efforts, possible explanations for these 
non-findings are offered below. 
Two-tier advice process. The counselor tactic suggested by Eisenhardt was not something that the fast TMTs in our 
sample incorporated into their decision process. Indeed, in addition to failing to achieve statistical significance in the 
regression, the sign was reversed. There are two very plausible explanations of this non-finding: the first deals with 
way in which the "counselor" was conceptualized; and the second deals with the "tie-breaker" flavor of two-tier 
advice tactics. 
Eisenhardt explains the "counselor" process she observed in the fast TMTs as the use by the CEO of an 
experienced member of the top management team who acted as a knowledgeable and unbiased sounding board. In 
their 1991 study, Judge and Miller conceived of the "counselor" as an external member of the board of directors. 
This highlights a fundamental flaw in the model proposed by Eisenhardt, and in the way we operationalized the 
counselor construct. A critical distinction future researchers should make in the conceptualization of the counselor 
centers on who that person is, more particularly, whether the counselor is internal to the TMT or an outsider. The 
reasoning for this is that other members of the top management team may react to the existence of a counselor very 
differently depending on the status of the advisor - internal vs external. The use by the CEO of an internal counselor 
is likely to be visible to other members of the team. Depending on the composition of the team, the individual 
motivations of team members, and a host of other factors, team members may react unfavorably to the increased 
influence the counselor appears to have with the CEO. There is some evidence for this scenario from Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois' paper on politics and decision-making in TMTs. "(our meetings are) open and forthright" . . ."It's very 
open ... we talk as a group, not committees" (1988: 752). One instance related in the paper described several team 
members voicing their displeasure at the coalition of three members (including the CEO) who tended to have 
off-line, but visible, conversations that were perceived to result in the decision being made. Certainly the reliance of 
the CEO on an internal counselor could be viewed by other TMT members in a similar light. The likely response to 
such a situation is bi-modal: (1) TMT members may decide they do not matter and thus decrease participation in 
decision-making; or (2) TMT members may deal with the influence of the counselor by forming a counter-coalition 
and employing various political tactics. 
In contrast to the potential for dysfunctional behavior associated with internal counselors, the use of an external 
counselor may better aid the decision process. First, the jealousy and feelings of devalue risked in the first scenario 
are unlikely when an outsider is used. The outsider is much less likely to be known, or visible to the TMT, thus the 
CEO can portray counselor-aided decisions as their own, and use other tactics (e.g., consensus with qualification) to 
mitigate the process loss that typically accompanies autocratic decision-making. Second, an external counselor is 
even more likely to be unbiased than the plateaued executive Eisenhardt describes in her study. As compared to the 
plateaued executive, the outsider really has very little at stake - they do not work for the firm, they may have little to 
no equity holdings in the firm, and are likely providing the advice for no other reason than friendship with the CEO. 
The implication of this goes beyond the reliability of the advice the CEO is likely to receive. The real impact on 
decision speed comes in the increased efficacy the CEO will feel when making decisions based on the advice of a 
person with no stake in the organization, or agenda to pursue. 
Thus, in order to determine whether the counselor tactic is associated with more rapid strategic decision-making, 
it is necessary to separate internal from external advice systems. At a minimum, researchers should ascertain what 
the specific impact of the use of a counselor has on group process, politics, and CEO decision efficacy. 
Consensus with qualification. In order to avoid prolonged dissensus, Eisenhardt found that fast TMTs specified that 
efforts to reach consensus would persist for a pre-ordained amount of time, after which the CEO would make the 
call. Again, our research findings did not support the role of this tactic in speeding decisions. There are two 
plausible explanations for this non-finding: (1) tie-breakers may homogenize decision duration, rather than 
minimize it; and (2) fast TMTs may rarely experience prolonged dissensus. 
There is a fair amount of support for the idea that TMTs may routinize their decision processes over time. That is, 
decision-making techniques, if successful, may become a relatively permanent part of a team's repertoire of 
behavior. Indeed, Eisenhardt (1989) and others (Wally and Baum, 1994) argue that the development of experi-
ence-based intuition, and routines for decision-making may speed the process in some teams. The corollary to this 
argument is that routines may continue to be followed even in circumstances where they are dysfunctional. Habits 
may be formed based on early evidence of usefulness, but may persist in the absence of continued functionality. 
In the present case, TMTs may have developed tie-breaker rules such as "consensus with qualification" and 
experience these to be effective ways of dealing with stalemate. One example of such a rule might be that the team 
agrees to discuss the various viewpoints surrounding an important decision issue for one month, after which they 
will spend an additional week to attempt to reach consensus on the proper course of action. If consensus is not 
forthcoming, the CEO will make the decision. Such a rule would certainly constrain the duration of major decisions 
to five weeks and most TMTs would consider this a fairly speedy process. The unintended consequence of such a 
rule, were it to become routinized, is the propensity of the TMT to take five weeks to make decisions even when the 
issues may be much more easily and quickly resolved. The structure introduced by the tie-breaker tactic could, 
therefore, actually lengthen the duration of decision-making in some instances, the end result being the 
homogenization rather than maximization of decision pace. 
A second possibility exists that might also explain the non-finding for the "consensus with qualification" tactic. It 
is quite feasible that fast TMTs simply do not experience prolonged stalemates, and thus are not in a position to need 
or develop such tie-breakers. The results of our analysis lend some support for this view. Fast TMTs were very 
likely to depend heavily on real-time information, to use side-by-side comparison of alternatives, and to integrate 
current decisions into a coherent pattern of strategy. The use of these three "tactics" forces teams to deal in real time 
with all of the issues involved in making the decision. There are no time gaps or discontinuities which may lead to 
differential understanding of the issues. The process that emerges through the use of these three tactics may be much 
more objective, thus facilitating the rapid resolution of factual and perceptual differences amongst team members. 
Simply stated, fast decision-making teams may rarely get to point where they have occasion to utilize tie-breakers. 
Finally, Eisenhardt specifies only two ways in which the CEO can actively deal with dissensus, however, there 
are many other means of conflict resolution that are not included in the model. An important way to distinguish 
between alternative conflict management styles may be the degree of passivity. Active management of conflict by 
the TMT should result in rapid decision-making. 
Smooth process. Smooth process, as has been discussed above, is a fuzzy label that could encompass multiple 
constructs. In addition to cohesion, conflict, and consensus, smooth process might reasonably be interpreted to mean 
a lack of political behaviors within the TMT. A full model of decision speed would necessarily incorporate various 
political behaviors, discriminate between cognitive and affective conflict in the TMT, and measure cohesion and 
consensus separately. In this way, the field can determine with much improved precision exactly which sorts of 
processes are driving decision speed. The non-finding for smooth process reported here highlights this need. 
Decision speed. The pace of decision-making is a multifaceted construct. One common conceptualization of 
decision speed is in terms of the absolute amount of time that passes between issue identification and the choosing 
of a course of action. Another way to think of pace is in terms of the relative speed with which a TMT makes 
decisions. Further, there are at least two ways to conceptualize relative speed: (1) are we quicker than our rivals?; 
and (2) are we quick enough to meet or exceed the rate of change in our environment? Future research should 
explore these variations on the theme of decision speed to determine which types of speed are most important to 
competitive advantage. 
Managerial implications 
The results of this study hold important implications for management practice. In providing further empirical 
support for Eisenhardt's decision-making model, we can reiterate with additional confidence and increased precision 
the behaviors and strategies that managers can employ to make rapid decisions. 
First, managers can be confident that quick decisions do not have to be low quality decisions. While this research 
does not directly measure decision quality, a more comprehensive decision process should reasonably lead to better 
decision outcomes (Wally and Baum, 1994). Top management teams that made very quick decisions were also able 
to consider multiple alternatives. Moreover, use of restricted search by some teams did not help to speed the team's 
decision. The key factor was the manner in which the TMTs went about comparing the alternative courses of action. 
Fast TMTs were able to look at several options concurrently, to quickly determine which options were of highest 
quality, and then to focus on just these few. In contrast, TMTs that looked at alternatives in a serial fashion were 
very slow to come to a decision. 
Second, managers who are "up on things" are in a much superior position to make quick decisions. Eisenhardt 
suggests that there may be various ways TMTs can ensure that they are up to speed when the decision is at hand. 
The critical factor is for the managers in the top management team to have real-time access to key information 
about the state of the firm, what competitors are doing, and any important changes in the external environment. We 
propose that the utilization of nested information systems, and Internet notification services (e.g., automated daily 
searches based on key words) can help managers have the information they need at all times. 
Third, managers need to attempt to make decisions in the context of previous actions. The ability to integrate 
current decisions with the overall decision history of the organization actually increases the speed with which 
executives make decisions. This is in addition to the obvious advantages an overarching integrated plan can provide 
a firm. 
Finally, while our results did not support the role of smooth group process in facilitating decisions, it did not 
preclude the possibility that certain types of cooperative behaviors of TMTs might be functional. More study is 
needed to determine whether smooth process is a good thing for decision-making bodies, and if so in what ways. 
In conclusion, it appears that the top management teams of firms will continue to face increasing levels of 
uncertainty and competitive pressure. TMTs that are able to quickly assess the competitive landscape and make 
good quality decisions in a timely fashion will provide their organizations with the best chance to succeed in the 
entrepreneurial millennium. 
Notes 
1 One organization included in the sample had only 45 employees. Because this organization was not a start-up and met all 
other requirements of the research, it was deemed acceptable for inclusion in the study. 
2 Although Hambrick and colleagues (1996) reported no significant correlation between action propensity and action speed, 
the constructs and measures used in their study differed substantially from our conceptualization of decision speed and 
confidence to act. 
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Appendix A 
Selected studies of concepts related to TMT decision-making 
Year 
1975 
1984 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1995 
1991 
1991 
1991 
1991 
1991 
1991 
1992 
Study 
Taylor 
Dollinger 
Wagner, Pfeffer, 
and O'Reilly 
Coodstein and 
O'Reilly 
Goodstein and 
O'Reilly 
Zengerand 
Lawrence 
MacCrimmonand 
Wehrung 
Banteland 
Finkelstein 
Haleblianand 
Finkelstein 
Hitt and Tyler 
Jackson etal. 
Miller 
Smith 
Smith, Grimm, 
Gannon, and Chen 
Jackson 
Demographic 
concept 
Age 
Education 
Job tenure heterogeneity 
Past joint work experience 
Tenure 
Past joint work experience 
TMT size 
TMT age 
TMT size 
TMT size 
TMT age 
Heterogeneity 
Tenure 
Education 
Industry experience 
Heterogeneity 
Associated 
decision concept 
Slow decision-making and 
increased information seeking 
during decision-making 
Tolerance for ambiguity 
Turnover, conflict 
Trust and cohesion 
Trust and cohesion 
Communication frequency 
Lower communication frequency 
Risk aversion 
Lower cohesion 
Lower cohesion, less communication, 
higher creativity, higher 
organizational performance 
Risk aversion 
Decreased social integration 
Restricted information gathering 
Increased competitive response 
Increased competitive response 
Dissensus 
1992 
1993 
1993 
1994 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1998 
1999 
Wiersemaand 
Bantel 
Wiersema and 
Bantel 
Bantel 
Hambrick, 
Celetkanycz, and 
Fredrickson 
Smith etal. 
Smith etal. 
Wallyand Baum 
Jackson, May, 
and Whitney 
Hambrick, Cho, 
and Chen 
Hambrick, Cho, 
and Chen 
Hambrick, Cho, 
and Chen 
Hambrick, Cho, 
and Chen 
Hambrick, Cho, 
and Chen 
Amason and 
Sapienza 
Miller, Burke, 
and Click 
Papadakis, Lioukas 
and Chambers 
Knight etal. 
TMT size 
Heterogeneity 
Education 
Age 
TMT size 
Experience heterogeneity 
Education 
Heterogeneity 
Education heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity in 
organizational tenure 
Functional heterogeneity 
Education 
Tenure in organization 
TMT size 
Cognitive diversity 
CEO organizational tenure 
Heterogeneity 
Lower cohesion, lower 
communication frequency 
Use of more sources of information, 
more creative, decreased social 
integration 
Increased demand for detailed 
information 
Solidification of executives mental 
models 
Communication formality 
Formality of communication 
Cognitive complexity 
Increased variance in decision-
making alternatives 
Increased actions, decreased action 
speed 
Increased actions 
Decreased action speed 
Increased actions 
Lower propensity to act 
Increased cognitive and affective 
conflict 
Decision-making comprehensiveness 
long-range planning 
Decentralization of decision-making 
Decreased strategic consensus 
Appendix B 
Items and reliabilities 
Variable Items (five-point Likert-type) 
Real-time Every member of the TMT knows where our organization is in its progress 
information toward our goals. 
This TMT continuosly monitors how our orgnization is peforming. 
Members of this TMT track our progress over time concerning our ideas 
and new developments. 
.80 
Year Study Demographic Associated 
concept decision concept 
Multiple 
simultaneous 
alternatives 
Two-tier 
advice 
process 
Consensus 
with 
qualification 
Decision 
integration 
Accelerated 
cognitive 
processing 
Smooth 
group 
process 
Confidence 
to act 
Decision 
speed 
Our TMT develops an exhaustive set of alternatives before making 
important management decisions. 
Our TMT seeks advice from all the firm's functional areas when making 
important strategic decisions. 
Our TMT is extremely thorough in its evaluation of strategic alternatives. 
When the group cannot reach consensus easily, the CEO will often consult 
a senior member of the TMT to reach a decision. 
The CEO often makes decisions with the aid of one or two members of the 
TMT. 
All members of the TMT are actively involved in making important 
strategic decisions, (reversed) 
When members of the TMT disagree on an important decision, the CEO 
often has to step in to make the final decision. 
When TMT members disagree on an important decision, the CEO ends up 
listening to different viewpoints but making up his/her own mind. 
We consider the impact of one strategic decision on the other strategic 
decisions we have made. 
We try to place strategic decisions into an overall pattern or plan. 
We make strategic decisions independent of our day-to-day operations. 
We consider each strategic decision in its own unique context, (reversed) 
When the need arises to make key decision, the members of this TMT are 
already "on the same page." 
This TMT doesn't need to spend much time "gearing up" when a key 
decision issue is at hand. 
When making strategic decisions, we often have to re-familiarize 
ourselves with the key issues involved, (reversed) 
We are always ready to make key decisions when they need to be made. 
Members of the TMT get along with each other well. 
Members of the TMT really stick together. 
Members of this TMT are ready to defend each other from criticism by 
outsiders. 
The quality of this TMT's decisions gives me the confidence to act. 
I feel this TMT can solve any problem we encounter. 
I have confidence in the TMT's ability to make sound decisions. 
I believe this TMT's decision-making capabilities can lead this firm to 
achieve high performance. 
This TMT moves quickly to make key strategic decisions. 
It takes this TMT too long to make important decisions, (reversed) 
This TMT routinely makes important decisions in under one month. 
.77 
.75 
.68 
.76 
.69 
.89 
.71 
